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CHAPTER 6
What Are the Limits to the Use of Force 
in UN Peacekeeping?
Mats Berdal
IntroductIon
The use and utility of military force have been central, if sometimes 
underlying and unarticulated, themes in discussions about the purposes, 
practices, and, indeed, the very identity of United Nations peacekeep-
ing since its inception. The precise historical and normative context 
within which those discussions have taken place has necessarily evolved 
over time. And yet, as the 2015 report of the High-Level Independent 
Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) makes clear, many of the key ques-
tions raised by the use of force in peacekeeping—be they of a practical or 
conceptual kind—are not fundamentally new (UN 2015). Chief among 
these is an overarching question that also frames and animates the pres-
ent chapter, to wit, what are the limits to the use of force in UN peace-
keeping? In approaching this question, the chapter and the arguments it 
advances have been divided into three closely connected parts.1
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1 Some of these arguments, especially in part three, draw upon and are more fully devel-
oped in Mats Berdal (2016).
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The first of these seeks to locate current preoccupations regarding 
the use of force within a wider historical context. To this end, it briefly 
traces both the thinking and practice around the use of force by UN 
blue helmets from the conceptual foundations laid in the era of “classi-
cal peacekeeping” to the focus on the protection of civilians (POC) and 
“robust peacekeeping” that have come to define the period since the 
Brahimi Panel Report of 2000 (UN 2000). It highlights how changes 
in geopolitical context and normative expectations have shaped and 
broadened the scope and aims of UN peacekeeping in important ways, 
with direct implications for the use of force. It also notes, however, that 
third-party involvement in civil war-like situations—as in South Sudan, 
the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali, Darfur, and the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC), where more than 80,000 peacekeepers 
are currently deployed—have brought to the fore cross-cutting challenges 
and policy dilemmas of a more fundamental kind when it comes to the 
application of military force by UN peacekeepers.
Developing the argument further, part two dwells on two sets of 
limitations to the effective use of force in UN operations. The first of 
these may be viewed as structural barriers to military effectiveness in UN 
operations, that is, limitations built in, as it were, to the very machinery 
and system for mounting, conducting, and sustaining UN peacekeeping 
operations. While some of the constraints thus imposed can be mitigated 
through reform of practices and procedures, to the extent that they are 
rooted in the intergovernmental and political character of the UN as an 
institution, they can never be fully overcome. This is an oft-neglected 
reality that will continue to place significant constraints on the  effective 
use of force by blue helmets in the future. Indeed, as will be argued 
more fully, with UN missions now routinely deployed in conditions of 
actual or latent civil war, entrusted with POC responsibilities and given 
mandates that allow for the robust use of force, the debilitating impact of 
inbuilt capability constraints on force cohesion and military effectiveness 
has become ever more acute.
Added to these structural, seemingly quasi-organic impediments to 
effectiveness in UN peacekeeping is a second set of limitations. These are 
the political and practical challenges that inevitably present themselves 
to a peacekeeping force deployed as an impartial third party in condi-
tions of on-going or unfinished civil war, that is, in conditions of persis-
tent insecurity and violence fuelled by power struggles among political 
elites for control of territory, populations, and governmental authority. 
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Over time, and indeed wherever the UN has deployed, such  conditions 
have also given rise to distinctive, complex, and frequently mutating 
political economies of conflict, the dynamics of which the UN, with its 
limited analytical capacities both at its headquarters in New York and 
in the field, has struggled to grasp, let alone factor into policy. Any 
assessment of the prospects for the effective use of force by UN peace-
keepers, nearly all of which are now deployed in situations of internal 
conflict, must take these realities into account.
The third and final section of the chapter looks in greater detail at 
the record of “robust peacekeeping” and the kind of lessons that can 
reasonably be drawn from operations since the late 1990s. In brief, it 
argues that the use of force in Sierra Leone (2000), Haiti (2006–2007) 
and the DRC (2003) all suggest that, at the tactical level, a properly 
equipped and properly commanded force can be used with decisive, 
albeit short-term, effect in response to immediate crises or emergen-
cies. The larger strategic lesson from the history of robust peacekeeping 
since 1999, however, is, fundamentally, a far more cautionary one; one 
that highlights the need for the activities of peacekeepers to be much 
more closely aligned than they have become over the past decade and 
half to the search for durable and inclusive political settlements to dis-
putes. As such, it is a conclusion that echoes one of the central messages 
of the HIPPO, and which has also emerged as an early theme of Antonio 
Guterres’ tenure as the ninth Secretary-General of UN.
FroM thE SInAI to thE KIvuS
In a concise and intellectually compelling effort to distil from the UN’s 
early forays into peacekeeping “certain basic principles and rules” that 
might “provide an adaptable framework for later operations,” the then 
Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjold, identified the “prohibition 
against any initiative in the use of force” as one of UN peacekeeping’s 
defining characteristics (Hammarskjold 1958). Alongside the principles 
of consent and impartiality, this commitment to minimum use of force 
except in self-defence came to constitute one of the core principles of 
so-called classical peacekeeping, defining its character as a distinctive 
form of third-party intervention involving the deployment of lightly 
equipped troops drawn from different member states and placed under 
UN command. Although the UN’s peacekeeping experience during 
the Cold War was richer and more varied than is often assumed, that 
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experience did not lead to a fundamental questioning or re-examination 
of those principles. Indeed, even some of the most “painful peacekeep-
ing” of the Cold War era—in the Congo in the early 1960s and South 
Lebanon between 1978 and 1982—were seen, in the final analysis, as a 
vindication of their importance (James 1983).
It was only with the changes in political climate spawned by the end 
of the Cold War that more radical ideas began to be floated about the 
future directions of UN operations and the sanctity of the principles on 
which these had traditionally been based. Between 1987 and 1992, the 
liberating impact of improvements in the international political land-
scape was demonstrated in a series of successful UN field operations from 
the Middle East and Asia to Central America and sub-Saharan Africa.2 
Although these operations were all, with one exception, comparatively 
modest in aim and small-scale in scope, they nonetheless contributed to 
a growing, if inchoate, sense that the long-established practices and func-
tions of UN peacekeeping might now be developed in new and far more 
ambitious directions.3 Thus, in An Agenda for Peace, released in June 
1992 when the hopes and normative aspirations of international society 
were still closely aligned with the optimism of the early post-Cold War 
period, the newly appointed Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali 
urged the Security Council to “consider the utilization of peace-enforce-
ment units in clearly defined circumstances” (UN 1992b). More sugges-
tive still, he defined peacekeeping as involving the deployment of a UN 
presence “hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned,” (ibid., 
para. 20, my emphasis) thus hinting that the self-denying ordinance 
 governing the use of force was ripe for re-examination.
Such optimism as could be gleaned from An Agenda for Peace proved, 
however, to be short-lived. Between 1992 and 1995, the horrors of 
Angola, Somalia, Rwanda, and former Yugoslavia—all places where UN 
peacekeepers had been deployed yet conspicuously failed to halt mass 
2 These included the UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG), active from 
1988 to 1991; the UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP) 
between 1988 and 1990; the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I) from 1988 to 
1991; the United Nations Observer Group (ONUCA) established in 1989 and successfully 
terminated in 1992; as well as the larger, more complex and, ultimately, successful, UN 
Transition Assistance Group in Namibia (UNTAG) between 1989 and March 1990.
3 For a revealing sense of the climate of optimism at the time, see the various presenta-
tions made by member states at the Security Council summit, the first of its kind, held in 
late January 1992 (UN 1992a).
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atrocities—ushered in a profound crisis of UN peacekeeping. Taking 
stock in early 1995, Boutros Ghali issued a Supplement to An Agenda 
for Peace; a document markedly different in tone from the optimism of 
three years earlier and, more significantly, gloomy in its conclusions 
regarding the prospects for the use of force in peacekeeping operations. 
In essence, Boutros-Ghali called for a return to “basic principles,” argu-
ing that “peacekeeping and the use of force (other than in self-defence) 
had to be seen as alternative techniques and not as adjacent points on a 
continuum, permitting easy transition from one to the other” (UN 1995, 
para. 36). Both more rigorous and cogent in its analysis of the real-world 
challenges of post-Cold War peacekeeping than its precursor document, 
the Supplement rightly emphasised the limits of UN-led operations in 
civil war-like situations, especially so when member states were only pre-
pared, as they had repeatedly demonstrated over the previous three years, 
to will the ends and not the means. Even so, the Secretary-General’s 
intervention in early 1995 did not settle the discussion about the use 
of force by UN peacekeepers. The nature and the scale of UN’s peace-
keeping failures between 1992 and 1995 meant that, at one level, there 
simply could be no “return to basics.” This would become even clearer 
some six months after the release of the Supplement, when the UN “safe 
area” of Srebrenica in Eastern Bosnia was overrun by Bosnian Serb forces. 
The bloody and horrific aftermath of Srebrenica’s capture, just one year 
on from the genocide in Rwanda, inevitably and quite understandably 
influenced the subsequent evolution of UN peacekeeping and the discus-
sion about its purposes.4 As the spate of new operations since 1999 has 
shown, the apparent determination to ensure that the horrors of Rwanda 
and former Yugoslavia would never again be repeated on the UN’s watch 
has emphatically not resolved the deeper tension between ends and 
means highlighted by the Supplement, tensions which, if anything, have 
become more acute. What it plainly has done, however, is to influence 
the mandate and change the operational focus of UN peacekeepers, with 
important implications for the question of the use of force.
The single most important manifestation of this change is the grow-
ing centrality of the “Protection of Civilians” (POC) as a task formally 
4 Contributing powerfully to this, were two detailed and damning inquires into UN’s 
role in Rwanda and Srebrenica, both of them published in 1999. See “The Fall of 
Srebrenica” (UN 1999a) and “Report of the Independent Inquiry in UN actions During 
the Rwanda Genocide” (UN 1999b).
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entrusted to UN peacekeepers. The Security Council first expressed 
“its willingness to consider how peacekeeping mandates might better 
address the negative impact of armed conflict on civilians” in September 
1999 (UN 1999c, para. 11). Since then, POC has become the subject of 
regular debates by the Council and, more significantly, beginning with 
the establishment of the UN operation in Sierra Leone in October 1999, 
missions have routinely and expressly been mandated under Chapter VII 
of the Charter “to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat 
of physical violence” (UN 1999d, para. 14). The growing focus on civil-
ian protection is also a key factor behind the calls for more muscular, or 
robust, peacekeeping that have become such a notable feature of contem-
porary UN peacekeeping practice and discourse (UN 2009). Since 1999 
the Council has given peacekeepers authority under Chapter VII of the 
Charter to “use all necessary means,” or “take the necessary action,” to 
accomplish their mission. In a number of individual operations, notably in 
Sierra Leone, Haiti, and the Congo, that authority has in turn provided 
the basis for taking the initiative in the use of force. The trend culminated 
in March 2013 when the Council decided that the UN’s troubled Congo 
mission should be strengthened with the creation of a Force Intervention 
Brigade (FIB)—a “milestone” in the evolution of UN peacekeep-
ing, according to the Secretary General at the time (UN 2014)—whose 
mandate would be “to carry out targeted offensive operations … in a 
robust, highly mobile and versatile manner” (UN 2013, para. 12b).
When the Secretary-General authorised his review of peace opera-
tions in 2014, five of the UN’s largest missions—in Darfur, the DRC, 
the CAR, Mali, and South Sudan—were all operating under Chapter 
VII, and all were centrally focused on the protection of civilians. The 
distinctly uneven record of civilian protection in these operations, along 
with the absence of political progress towards lasting stability in each 
case, provided the immediate backdrop to the HIPPO and to the con-
tinuing discussions about the precise role of force, its limitations, and 
 possibilities in UN peacekeeping.
LIMItAtIonS to thE uSE oF ForcE By un PEAcEKEEPErS
Structural Barriers to Military Effectiveness
In a written submission to the HIPPO in March 2015, some twenty for-
mer UN Force Commanders offered a series of detailed recommendations 
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whose implementation would, in their view, help ensure “success in future 
peace operations.” Penned by Robert Mood, a respected officer with 
extensive UN experience, the letter stressed the need for “strengthened 
command and control, improved preparedness and mission design, use 
of modern technology, enhanced capabilities, improved mission informa-
tion, and strengthened logistics and support” (Mood 2015). Designed to 
address long-standing capacity gaps and impediments to operational effec-
tiveness, the proposals ranged widely. Unsurprisingly, given the breath of 
experiences shared by the signatories to the letter, the recommendations 
also made good operational sense.
To any long-time observer of UN field operations, however, very few 
of the deficiencies that the letter sought to address were fundamentally 
new. The haphazard and unreliable provision of key capacities and force 
enablers, notably in logistics, intelligence, engineering, aviation support, 
and reserves; the persistence of complex and cumbersome regulations 
governing finance, procurement, and human resources; the challenges of 
force generation and speed of deployment; and the “dysfunctional” nature 
of relations between the UN in New York and field headquarters, have all 
long plagued UN peacekeeping.5 They have also proved remarkably resist-
ant, if not entirely impervious, to substantive reform. The UN’s system 
of human resources management—a distinctly unglamorous but nonethe-
less critically important area if one is genuinely concerned about improv-
ing the effectiveness of UN field operations—illustrates the nature of the 
problem.
The system was originally set up to cater for a largely static and head-
quarters-oriented organisation, employing career civil servants primarily 
engaged in providing administrative support for conferences and meet-
ings among member states. In short, it was emphatically not designed 
for an organisation where, at present, more than 50 percent of secre-
tariat staff is deployed on operations, many of which require a diverse 
and complex mix of technical expertise. And yet, the original model 
and the rules and regulations that go with it, have “never been funda-
mentally overhauled” (Chandran and von Einsiedel 2016, p. 3). In the 
words of Chandran and von Einsiedel, seasoned observers of the UN 
5 With regard to challenge of rapid deployment the HIPPO notes in passing that “since a 
UN standing capacity was first proposed, by the Secretary-General in 1948, no significant 
progress has been made” (UN 2015, para. 188). For an instructive illustration of the persis-
tence of similar kinds of weaknesses and challenges in UN operations, see Goulding (1997).
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scene, “it has proven impossible, again and again, to design a recruit-
ment system that can both satisfy the process requirements for UN 
headquarters recruitment, while also supporting large, fast-moving field 
operations.”6 The failure to address these challenges, then, is not new, 
nor is there a shortage of ideas about how best to tackle them. The prob-
lem lies elsewhere: the bureaucratic and, above all, political obstacles to 
meaningful reform have simply proved too powerful. Indeed, according 
to the HIPPO, “in operating environments that demand more tailored 
and flexible UN peace operations it appears that human resources poli-
cies may be moving in the opposite direction” (UN 2015, para. 296).
None of this is to suggest that practical efforts to improve the machin-
ery and the effective functioning of UN peacekeeping should be aban-
doned, nor is it to suggest that previous reform initiatives have all come 
to naught. Following the recommendations of the Brahimi Panel in 
2000, for example, the Secretariat was given greater authority to spend 
money early in the planning stages of a mission, and important steps 
were taken to pre-position strategic stocks to ensure more rapid deploy-
ment of peacekeepers to the field (Durch et al. 2003). Both were gen-
uinely valuable steps aimed at improving the day-to-day running and 
conduct of operations. Even so, there remains a natural limit—insuffi-
ciently recognised in much of literature on UN reform, including that 
generated by the Secretariat itself7—to which the weaknesses and defi-
ciencies that have historically characterised UN field operations can ever 
be more than partially mitigated, let alone overcome. The reason for this 
lies, as noted above, with the intergovernmental and intensely political 
nature of the organisation, which will always limit the degree to which a 
UN Force can work as a truly integrated, cohesive, and effective military 
force. The implications for the conduct of operations are best illustrated 
by the perennial challenge of command and control in UN operations.
In their submission to the HIPPO, the former Force Commanders 
stressed the importance of “One mandate – one mission – one concept,” 
7 See, for example, “Evaluation of the implementation and results of protection of civilian 
mandates in United Nations peacekeeping operations,” UN Office of Internal Oversight 
(UNOIO 2014). While this report usefully collates and catalogues poor and inconsistent 
implementation of mandates by various missions, it proposes solutions that underplay, if 
not entirely disregard, the political character of peacekeeping and political sources of TCCs 
behaviour.
6 Ibid.
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noting that the key to mandate implementation lay in “unity of com-
mand under the authority of the SRSG/Head of Mission” (Mood 
2015). This insistence on a single chain of command and on maintaining 
the international character of any UN Force, is not new; indeed, it has 
been presented as a sine qua non of effective UN peacekeeping since its 
beginning in the 1950s. And yet, it has always come up against the real-
ity of conflicting national priorities, risk-aversion among troop-contrib-
uting countries (TCCs), and uncertain loyalty from contingents, factors 
that have translated into the adoption, spoken or unspoken, of national 
caveats and a penchant for interfering in the UN chain of command. 
This has been the case especially when the perceived risks to peacekeep-
ers have been high, and when questions regarding the use of force have 
been involved. Even so, as long as the peacekeeping environment has 
proved generally benign, and support from a united Security Council has 
been in place, UN missions have historically been able to function (with 
greater of lesser degree of effectiveness) notwithstanding continuing 
capacity gaps and weaknesses in command and control. Managing such 
inherent tensions has been a major role of Force Commanders and heads 
of mission. Indeed, their ability—through improvisation, ingenuity, and 
flexibility in mandate interpretation—to surmount and work around 
challenges thrown up by limited resources and a less than optimal system 
of administrative, managerial, and political support, is among the most 
important (and under-appreciated) qualities of mission leadership in UN 
operations.8
Developments over the past decade and a half, however, have placed 
altogether new strains on UN peacekeeping, posing challenges not 
only for mission leadership but to the very viability of missions them-
selves. A cursory survey of the five largest UN missions underway in 
early 2017—accounting for more than 80,000 out of a total of some 
115,000 peacekeepers deployed on 16 missions worldwide—shows that 
operating environments are now, as a general rule, anything but stable 
and benign.9 Instead, they typically include a combination or all of the 
8 For an example of how mission leadership helped shepherd an operation through to 
success in spite of the UN machinery designed to assist the mission, see Berdal (2015, pp. 
416–429).
9 These are the missions to South Sudan (UNMISS), Darfur (UNAMID), Mali 
(MINUSMA), CAR (MINUSCA) and the DRC (MONUSCO), see United Nations 
(2017). “Peacekeeping operations fact sheet.” Accessed 9 November 2017. https://peace-
keeping.un.org/en/peacekeeping-fact-sheet-oct-2017.
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following characteristics: the absence of clear front lines; vast geograph-
ical distances amidst war-ravaged, even non-existent, infrastructure; 
the presence of large numbers of internally displaced; numerous armed 
groups, often poorly controlled and prone to preying on civilians; and 
persistent insecurity and on-going violence fuelled by both predatory 
political economies and power struggles among political elites. Now, the 
deployment of peacekeepers with a mandate to protect civilians and the 
authority to engage in robust peacekeeping in these conditions, have had 
two, partly conflicting, consequences.
First, these conditions have plainly heightened the operational impor-
tance of ensuring that UN missions actually do function as cohesive and 
integrated formations, properly resourced and with the most critical weak-
nesses—in the areas of tactical mobility, logistics support, and intelligence 
capacity—addressed. Of these weaknesses, arguably the most urgent 
requirement, given the non-permissive and volatile nature of contem-
porary peacekeeping environments, has proved to be the need for more 
systematic intelligence collection, assessment, and conflict analysis capac-
ities by UN missions, the lack of which in zones of conflict has critically 
undermined attempts to grapple with underlying political economies of 
conflict and the way in which these often drive violence and encourage 
predation against civilian populations.10 As noted above, however, plug-
ging such capacity gaps has proved difficult to achieve even in the best of 
circumstances. The result when it comes to POC, as the Brahimi Panel 
Report perceptively foresaw back in 2000, has been to create a very “large 
mismatch between desired objective and resources available to meet it,” 
as well as to guarantee “continuing disappointment with United Nations 
follow through in this area [of civilian protection]” (UN 2000, para. 63).
Second, these very conditions have also heightened differences among 
TCCs about how mandates should be interpreted and, specifically, over 
attitudes to the use of force. This, again, has further undermined efforts 
to achieve Force cohesion and unity of purpose, in many cases pushing 
the mission beyond the “outer limits for UN peacekeeping [as] defined 
by their composition, character and inherent capability limitations” 
(UN 2015, p. x). Significantly, TCCs that now provide the bulk of 
10 For this, see Kristof Titeca and Daniel Fahey’s (2016) study of MONUSCO’s failure 
to comprehend the character and dynamics driving the actions of the rebel group known as 
the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in the DRC between 2014 and 2016. For the conse-
quences of relying on flawed intelligence, see also Fahey (2016, pp. 91–100).
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peacekeepers, India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan, as well as many contribu-
tors from Latin America, remain deeply sceptical of the trend in favour of 
more robust use of force by UN peacekeepers (Modi 2015).
Limitations to the Third-Party Use of Force in Conditions  
of Civil War and Internal Conflict
The second set of limitations to the use of force connects still more 
directly to the context of internal conflict. A UN peacekeeping force that 
is deployed within the jurisdiction of a sovereign state where the host 
government is faced with internal challenges to its authority will, over 
time, find it increasingly difficult to remain above the domestic political 
fray, however much it may formally aspire to do so. Alan James, writing 
about the UN’s involvement in Congo in the early 1960s, pinpointed 
the elemental reason for this: “On an internal scene a government is but 
one of the actors; in one degree or another the political balance is likely 
to be in constant movement; and the way in which a UN force responds 
may well have some impact on the balance, or – which in effect comes to 
the same thing – be seen as shifting the balance” (James 1994, p. 46). 
For UN peacekeepers to take the initiative in the use of force—especially, 
but not merely, when force is used in support of the host government—
cannot but have an impact on that political balance, and will also affect 
the military and political calculations of other conflict actors. As such, 
it runs the risk of undermining the UN’s chief asset as an interlocutor 
in internal conflicts and the search for political solutions: its perceived 
impartiality in relation to major disputants. In the words of Jean Marie 
Guéhenno, reflecting on the UN’s post-Cold War experience in Congo:
…if the UN becomes the auxiliary of a government whose legitimacy and 
representativeness is still questioned, it may lose not only its military but its 
political legitimacy, putting at risk what is potentially it most valuable con-
tribution: the capacity to foster compromise among various groups as the 
indispensable base of lasting peace. (Guéhenno 2015, p. 147)
The UN’s Congo experience highlights another inescapable risk associ-
ated with the enforced and prolonged proximity of UN missions to host 
governments in situations of on-going internal conflict. In all such cases, 
even if consent for the UN’s presence remains formally in place, rela-
tions between missions and host governments have tended to deteriorate 
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as host governments—often weak and beset by internal challenges, sus-
picious of outside meddling and protective of their sovereign rights—
become ever more resentful of obstacles to their unfettered control over 
internal affairs. When, as is now overwhelmingly the case, the mandates 
given to UN missions are themselves politically intrusive and include 
potentially conflicting objectives, tensions have only been further height-
ened, with the result that both the credibility and leverage of UN mis-
sions have dwindled over time. Perhaps nowhere has this dynamic been 
more evident than in the DRC and South Sudan where the UN has been 
charged with protecting civilians as well as with monitoring government 
observance with human rights obligations and supporting security sector 
reform, and yet where, in both cases, government security forces have 
proved to be major sources of violence against civilians. Indeed, accord-
ing to the UN’s own reporting “the Congolese state was responsible 
for roughly 65% of the human rights violations [in 2016], and in many 
parts of the country the army is seen by local communities as the most 
dangerous armed group” (Day 2017, p. 2). Reviewing the period before 
the eruption of full-scale civil war in South Sudan in December 2013, 
an assessment of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) concluded 
that “intractable problems, near-impossible dilemmas and difficult trade-
offs will be a constant, especially given its decision to take on multiple, at 
times, conflicting roles” (Hemmer 2013, p. 8; da Costa and de Coning 
2015). It is a finding equally applicable to other operations where the 
UN is deployed in intrastate settings in the absence of a viable political 
process.
LESSonS In roBuStnESS: thE uSE oF ForcE  
FroM hAItI to thE drc
Mindful of these structural and political limitations to the use force by 
UN peacekeepers, what lessons for future operations should one draw 
from the experience of robust peacekeeping over the past decade and 
a half? The answer to that question needs to start with the recogni-
tion, or reaffirmation, of the importance of upholding the basic, albeit 
broad, distinction between what is essentially a peacekeeping operation 
and one that is premised on the logic of war-fighting and enforcement. 
It is equally important, however, to be clear about what exactly this 
means in practise, and what implications flow from it. The meaning of 
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“essentially” in this context has little to do with whether or not a mis-
sion has been formally authorised under Chapter VII of the UN Charter; 
by now, almost all are as a matter of routine. The key to the distinction 
lies in whether or not achieving mission objectives—including the larger 
and key strategic objective of reaching a political settlement to end vio-
lence—is fundamentally dependent, in the final analysis, on building 
consent and support for the activities of peacekeepers among the par-
ties. The history of peacekeeping since 1999 shows just how fragmentary 
and incomplete such consent can be, nowhere more so than when peace-
keepers operate in conditions of civil war. Combining activities that rely 
on consent, cooperation, and access with offensive military operations, 
all within the same mission, have historically proved highly destabilising, 
politically as well as in humanitarian terms. For all its finely balanced and 
properly justified criticism of UN actions in Bosnia, that conclusion was 
also at the heart of the Srebrenica Report issued in 1999: “peacekeeping 
and war fighting are distinct activities and should not be mixed” (UN 
1999a, 107). An inescapable corollary of this is that there will also be 
circumstances when the instrument of peacekeeping is not appropriate. 
The history of UN operations over the past decade and a half does not 
fundamentally alter these lessons.
Now, while the qualitative distinction between peacekeeping and 
enforcement must be reaffirmed, it does not follow from the above that 
the UN can or should only operate in environments where distinctions 
are clear-cut and simple, or that the use of force cannot, at the margins 
and in the right circumstances, be used with, potentially, decisive effect. 
There are instances since 1999 when properly equipped and properly 
commanded forces have scored tactical victories in response to immedi-
ate crises and emergencies: preventing the collapse of the UN mission 
Sierra Leone in 2000; dismantling the gang-structures Haiti in 2006–
2007; securing Bunia in eastern DRC in 2003 and in defeating Laurent 
Gbabgo’s violent challenge to the outcome of elections in Cote d’Ivoire 
in 2011. In evaluating these tactical successes, however, it is vital not to 
lose sight of the wider, and more critical, lessons offered by each case.
For one, all of these involved well-equipped, competently led and 
highly capable forces (drawn from the UK in the case of Sierra Leone, 
Brazil in the case of Haiti and France in the case of Bunia and Cote 
d’Ivoire), precisely what UN missions have tended to lack. Moreover, 
the military challenge faced in each case, though real enough, was 
mounted by marginal and, ultimately, militarily unimpressive actors. Still 
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more important than these qualifications, however, is the fact that the 
long-term strategic outcome of these and similar actions depends criti-
cally on whether or not the use of force has been properly calibrated to 
support an overall strategy aimed at reducing violence, mitigating con-
flict, and fostering a political solution to the conflict at hand. Whether 
the actions of UN peacekeepers, including the use of military force, 
serve to advance these kinds of strategic objectives is, ultimately, the 
true measure of their effectiveness. And yet, with the partial exception of 
Sierra Leone, the all-important link between military action and political 
purpose has been weak to non-existent in UN operations since 1999.
In Sierra Leone, the UK military intervention in 2000 was able 
to check, at a critical moment, advances by the RUF and other armed 
groups in the country. Crucially, however, this short, sharp, and limited 
action was followed by concerted diplomatic moves aimed at shoring up 
the post-war political dispensation in the country; moves that included 
a sustained effort to galvanise others to contribute to a beefed up and 
reconfigured UN mission, as well as a serious and long-term commit-
ment to reforming and professionalising the country’s armed forces 
(Riley 2006, 2). As one detailed study of the use of force by British 
forces in Sierra Leone makes clear, even though the “use of force was 
critical in creating an opportunity for political progress, it was not in 
itself decisive or even that strategically significant”—long-term success 
was contingent on political follow-up at the UN and regionally, under-
pinned by a plausibly effective programme of security sector reform 
(Ucko 2016).
In Haiti, by contrast, “tactical success through the use of force led 
to only limited strategic payoffs in the larger state consolidation mission, 
with MINUSTAH struggling to integrate the use of force into a larger 
project for Haitian political and economic transformation.”11 A simi-
lar picture emerges from the various applications of robust force in the 
DRC, including Operation Artemis in 2003 and the Ituri campaign of 
2005.12 The record of MONUSCO’s Force Intervention Brigade since 
2013—the most ambitious attempt to conduct offensive operations 
11 Cockayne (2014, p. 738). Echoing these conclusions, see also Guéhenno (2015, pp. 
261–262).
12 Discussed more fully in Berdal (2016, pp. 11–17).
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within a peacekeeping setting—has proved even more troubling, with 
mounting evidence in 2016 that the force through its actions has, if 
anything, contributed to a worsening of the security situation in east-
ern DRC.13 In the words of one Senior Political Advisor working for in 
MONUSCO throughout 2016: “Not only has it failed to degrade the 
militias it was tasked to fight, but the FIB has potentially increased risks 
to civilians and diverted resources away from activities that might well 
serve them better.”14
Taken together, what all of these cases do is to underline a basic les-
son from the UN’s experience of “robust peacekeeping”: UN peacekeep-
ing missions are structurally ill-equipped and politically ill-suited to use 
force effectively in support of strategic objectives, and when they have 
attempted to do so in a political vacuum without proper resources, the 
medium to long-term consequence of their actions have been, more often 
than not, to destabilise the operating environment and complicate the 
search for political solutions.15 Even so, it is worth stressing again that 
none of this is to rule out the use of force by peacekeepers in all circum-
stances. The operations discussed here have all shown that in fluid and 
complex internal settings with multiple conflict actors, it will sometimes 
be possible and, indeed, necessary to differentiate between major dis-
putants, loosely defined as political and militarily significant actors, and 
more marginal spoilers, distinguished by their predatory agendas and, 
crucially, their lack of local legitimacy. Decisive military action against the 
latter may have a stabilising effect in the short term. Any lasting effect or 
achievement resulting from the use of force, however, will always, in the 
final analysis, depend on whether or not military action is “framed as an 
enabling component of a political strategy” (Doss 2014, p. 730).
14 Day (2017, p. 2). This article provides an excellent assessment of the FIB’s failure in 
the DRC.
15 Although beyond the scope of the present chapter, it is worth noting that the 
war-fighting role given to the FIB in the DRC has also raised legal issues relating to the 
use of force that ought properly to be considered in any wider discussion of challenges and 
limitations to the use of force in UN peacekeeping. For an excellent discussion see Sheeran 
and Case (2014).
13 Congo Research Group (2017). Since late 2016, there have been frequent clashes 
between the Congolese Army and the M-23, the Rwanda-backed rebel group which the 
FIB was initially credited with having successfully having defeated back in 2013.
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concLudIng thoughtS: rE-EStABLIShIng thE LInK BEtwEEn 
MILItAry ForcE And PoLItIcAL PurPoSE
When Jean-Marie Guéhenno, then head of the UN Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), visited the DRC in March 2006 to 
take stock of the challenges facing MONUC on the eve of the first elec-
tions in the country for 41 years, he used the occasion also to assess the 
impact of “the robust and unprecedented manner” in which UN mili-
tary forces, operating alongside and in support of the Congolese army 
(FARDC), had sought out and engaged armed groups over the previous 
year. The results, he found, were decidedly mixed, with the “negative 
consequences” of UN military operations—including reprisals against 
civilians by armed groups targeted by the UN, new “waves” of internally 
displaced and uncontrolled looting, pillaging and abuses committed by 
the elements of MONUC’s ally, the Congolese army—all suggesting the 
need to shift away from aggressive pursuit and “to start taking a longer-
view.” As he perceptively reported back to New York, “the reality is that 
foreign armed groups will need to be dealt with in the longer-term, in 
tandem with an economic and political strategy, and in a way that does 
not threaten civilian populations” (UN 2006). More than a decade on 
from Guéhenno’s visit, with the DRC still faced with political stasis, vio-
lence and humanitarian crisis, his recommendations remain, sadly, just as 
appropriate as they were back in 2006 (Gowan 2016). They also point to 
wider lessons for UN peacekeeping that transcend the particular circum-
stances of the DRC.
In the end, perhaps the single most important implication to flow 
from the analysis above is that UN peacekeeping in and of itself—and 
most certainly robust peacekeeping of the kind attempted over the past 
decade and a half—can only ever play a very limited part in helping to 
address the deeper sources of violent conflict in fragile and conflict-rid-
den states. UN peacekeepers can undertake a range of ancillary tasks 
aimed at strengthening and helping in the search for lasting political set-
tlement to conflicts. That range is now longer and more complex than 
it was in the era of “classical” peacekeeping and includes security sec-
tor reform, support for humanitarian relief operations, complex mon-
itoring, and confidence-building tasks. When conditions require and 
resources permit—as operations in Sierra Leone, Haiti and even at times 
the DRC have shown—UN forces may also be in a position to respond 
locally to obstructionist violence or immediate emergencies and defeat 
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“marginal actors” (Guéhenno 2015, p. 262). These are all important 
tasks and the scope for improving the quality of delivery in each is cer-
tainly there, especially in the vital area of security sector reform, which, 
too often, has been under-funded, overly technocratic in approach and 
ignorant of the political economies of conflict on the ground. But they 
are ancillary tasks in the sense that their lasting contribution to address-
ing conflict depends not only on how effectively they are delivered in a 
technical sense but, crucially, on whether they are aligned to and help 
advance the overriding objective of arriving at political agreements to 
end violence. A key and concluding implication to flow from this is that 
UN mission leaderships in the field, aided by the secretariat and backed 
by the Security Council, must—through improved political engagement, 
effective use of good offices, and enhanced analytical capacities—priori-
tise the search for political avenues and opportunities that promise ways 
out of conflict and protracted violence.
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